05/08/2022

Crew: Capt. Alejandro Larrea

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F/O Frederik Van Embden S#

I did a flight search the day before the flight on the IPAD for the previous flight on this sector as I usually do as a personal routine to prepare my flights in order to have an idea of what to expect regarding fuel burn, taxi out, RWY in use, flight plan route, SID, cruise level, STAR, approach, landing RWY, taxi in and parking area and set it on the Jeppesen app on the IPAD. Then I went through Fuel Data and Destination details to continue through the flight plan including NOTAMs, crew info, meteorology, and all the information included in the flight plan.

The day of the flight after receiving the first flight plan from the general system I went again through the same process to update the information and set up once again the Jeppesen app on the IPAD. Reviewing the NOTAMS I remember there was a taxiway construction immediately after going out of the cargo apron and a specific route to leave the apron, then checking the Jeppesen app I ticked all the relevant charts for my flight; RWY, REF, CO, expected SID with E/O. Taxi out route and app in case of immediate return. Then I checked the weather and took a look at the route. After this I did a performance calculation for the expected T/O weight and LDG weight at destination.

Once ready for the pick up time I went to do the check out and a little later met my F/O at the lobby and comment about the weather in the area since there was a storm and he saw from his room some aircraft going around; also which flight plan number was the last received and that he was going to be pilot flying as we discussed the day before and we left the hotel to the airport.

Once we arrived at the airport and to the aircraft we started doing the normal procedural checks and discussed the fuel quantity to refuel to be 19100 kgs (1200 kgs extra) based on the actual weather in the area and the fuel data statistics from the last 4 Fridays average. Looking at the fuel quantity on board we discovered that it was already refueled to 18700 kgs (3800 kgs above the STBY fuel) without any coordination with the crew (a report was written in the journey log) and then we asked for the 400 kgs left to reach the agreed quantity.

Then I went for the walk around finding a cargo loader inside the red line just under the left wingtip and requested to push it behind the line; just to find out that it was broken and was impossible to move it at that moment. Then back on board we finish the checks and briefing and pushed back on time.

Taxi out, take off and departure were without events, cruise with some deviations due to weather, arrival, approach and landing without events with the F/O as PF.

According to the ATIS we prepared RWY 09L for landing, did performance calculations and the F/O did the briefing following NOP's and during descend Approach told us to expect RWY 10C which I discussed with my F/O we should accept because it was longer and more comfortable for taxi since coming from RWY 09L there was a Restricted Turn from taxiway M to taxiway NN and we would have to

taxi further to cross RWY 27C in order to come from the opposite side to make a normal turn to the right from M to NN to continue to the cargo ramp. Then I set the approach in the CDU and did the performance calculation for RWY 10C on the EFB; briefing was updated by the F/O and we continue to the landing.

After landing we were instructed to vacate to the left on F and left on P and switch to 121.75. Once on this frequency I reported QR 67X Heavy on P and we were asked if we were cargo and we answered yes; then ground instructed us to continue to CC and hold short of RWY 10L. We did the after landing procedures and approaching 10L we were instructed to cross RWY 10L to hold short of taxiway K and contact 121.9. After crossing the runway and when able I reported our position Qatari 67X Heavy on CC to hold short of K and ground ask us if we could take L on the left but we already passed it; so then ground said "ok no problem" and instructed us to turn left on K, right on BB and immediately left turn to Z and hold short of RWY 09R. There was an AA B-737 on K so we couldn't continue taxing on K. When I read back the instructions ground corrected me with right on BB and left on BB2 to Z and hold short of RWY 09R; I read back again and the controller clarified with BB and BB2 which I readback as BB BB2 Qatari 67X heavy.

I was guiding my F/O alternating between the charts and moving map on the EFB and looking outside to confirm the taxiway signs; especially on this short left K, right BB, left BB2 since it was his first time to Chicago and my second time to Chicago; so I was being completely sure that we were turning on to the correct taxiway and turning in the correct direction. I had the IPAD as a back up as usual but it doesn't have GPS, the Jeppesen app is to slow to switch between charts, it freezes some times and when using the AMM after zooming in it shrinks a few seconds later so I was using the EFB as much as possible.

Once on taxiway BB2 I told him now straight ahead to Z and went back to the EFB to see the rest of the taxing instructions when I felt what I thought it was a sudden right brake application so I asked my F/O what happened and he answered "we hit it" and I asked we hit what; what do you mean and he answered "the light pole" and I asked again are you sure and he said "yes".

Then he set the parking brake; and few seconds later ground called us to continue taxing when I said "stand by please"; after a quick evaluation of the situation and not being sure exactly what happened I called ground and reported "I think we hit a pole". They ask us "you hit a pole" and I answered yes and instructed us to hold position. Mean while we started the APU, shutdown the engines, did the shutdown checklist and started evaluating the next steps to take.

Ground called us saying they were sending a service car and after a while an airport service car with the number 043 arrived; we asked for a frequency to contact them and we were given 119.25 and we kept in contact with ground and this frequency at the same time but initially there was no response until they called us on 119.25 reporting as car 043 and confirming that we had made contact with the light pole on the right wing. We asked if there was any leak and the answer was no and ask us "how they can help" and we answered that we will need a tow truck and stairs thinking at that moment that maybe it was possible to pushback the aircraft and tow it to the ramp or that we would need to disembark in that position.

In the meantime we received an ACARS message from IOC asking us if we still on the taxiway or have reached the parking position; I told my F/O to wait a moment before replying in order to have more information about the situation to be able to give them.

and stairs. Minutes later started to arrive at the scene airport police cars; airport service cars and later on the firefighters. At this moment with all this information we made contact with IOC through SATCOM and let them what happened and they told us that they were going to send some questions through ACARS; we received them and answered the four questions regarding: 1) Time of event; +/- 0135 UTC; 2) Which taxiway; BB2 as cleared by ATC Freq. 121.9; 3) Assess damage; unable to assess damage; 4) Freq. in contact; positive contact with ATC GND FREQ 121.9. While waiting for the equipment to arrive I filled the technical logbook reporting the event and together we filled the ASR.

One of the firefighter ladders was used as stairs and my F/O opened door 1L after disarming the doors and I went down to see what happened; took some pictures and came back to the aircraft.

Several people starting to come to the cockpit (a firefighter; an airport operations officer if I remember well) and among them I met the Station Cargo Manager which told me that he was already in contact with Doha. Also that he had requested a fast tow truck from AA to tow the aircraft to the cargo ramp, that we had to wait for the FAA/NTSB representative to arrive for some interview with us and at the same time maintenance crew was coming to evaluate the damage and maintenance crew from the airport also to check the light pole. Maintenance crew from the airport said they were afraid the light pole could fall down if the aircraft was moved so they asked to not move the aircraft and then they switch off the light pole. Maintenance crew arrived and after evaluating said that they needed Boeing to come and evaluate themselves.

We received a call from IOC and then they included MCC; they wanted to know if we were taxing straight or during a turn; we answered that we were taxing straight.

Through the cargo manager we received a message from Doha to cut off all electricity from the aircraft and leave it in that position. A moment later cargo manager told us that we were cleared to leave because FAA/NTSB representatives were not coming and instead they probably will contact us on our phones for which airport officer took pictures of our ID's and also our phone number:

We shut down the APU; did secure checklist and close 1L door and were taken to the hangar in an airport car to wait for the hotel transport which never arrived; so after waiting for a while inside his car the driver of the airport car decided to take us to the hotel. We arrived and checked in at the hotel. Once in my room I send the journey log and ASR.

Next day I contacted my F/O to see how he was and if somebody had contacted him; the answer was no. I saw an email from Capt. Amari which I replied and send the report as requested and the roster changes. Later In the evening we flew back to Doha DH.

This is all I have to report from the flight from ATL to ORD on August 05:2022.

Please fill free to contact me for any clarification of if I can help in anyway.

Best regards;